The Obvious Argument for the Inconceivability of Zombies

Drew McDermott
Yale University
Zombies are hypothetical creatures identical to us in behavior and internal functionality, but lacking experience. When the concept of zombie is examined in careful detail, it is found that the attempt to keep experience out does not work. So the concept of zombie is the same as the concept of person. Because they are only trivially conceivable, zombies are in a sense inconceivable.
Keywords zombies  functionalism
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