Values and Secondary Qualities

In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J.L. Mackie. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 110-129 (1985)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth about what the experience of value is like, or (in a familiar surrogate for phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought or discourse. The idea is, rather, that the very concept of the cognitive or factual rules out the possibility of an undiluted representation of how things are, enjoying, nevertheless, the internal relation to 'attitudes' or the will that would be needed to count as evaluative. On this view the phenomenology of value would involve a mere incoherence, if it were as Mackie says--a possibility that then tends (naturally enough) not to be so much as entertained. But, as Mackie sees, there is no satisfactory justification for supposing that the factual is, by definition, attitudinatively and motivationally neutral. This clears away the only obstacle to accepting his phenomenological claim; and the upshot is that non-cognitivism must offer to correct the phenomenology of value, rather than give an account of it. -/- In Machie's view the correction is called for. In this paper I want to suggest that he attributes an unmerited plausibility to this thesis, by giving a false picture of what one is committed to if one resists it.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Values and Secondary Qualities.T. Sorell - 1985 - Ratio (Misc.) 27 (2).
Values vs. Secondary Qualities.Dan López de Sa - 2006 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):197-210.
Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moral Values and Secondary Qualities.Elijah Millgram - 1999 - American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):253 - 255.
Errors and the Phenomenology of Value.Simon Blackburn - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J.L. Mackie. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 324--337.
Must Metaethical Realism Make a Semantic Claim?Guy Kahane - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):148-178.
Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J.L. Mackie.Ted Honderich (ed.) - 1985 - Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-04-06

Downloads
1,276 (#9,667)

6 months
118 (#37,614)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.
Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Problems of rationality.Donald Davidson (ed.) - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 306 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references