What is direct perceptual knowledge? A fivefold confusion
Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16 (2001)
Abstract
When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated ? but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1163/18756735-06201002
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Citations of this work
Moving Beyond Mirroring - a Social Affordance Model of Sensorimotor Integration During Action Perception.Maria Brincker - 2010 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Perceiving mental states: Co-presence and constitution.Laura Danón & Daniel Kalpokas - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (2).
The Real World Regained? Searle’s External Realism Examined.Douglas McDermid - 2004 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):1-9.