Ratio 23 (4):415-432 (2010)

Abstract
On the view proposed, the content of an intention in action is given by what one would say in expressing it, and the proper form for expressing such an intention is a statement about what one is doing: e.g. ‘I am doing such-and-such’. By contrast, some think that there are normative or evaluative elements to the content of an intention in action which would be left out of a form that merely stated facts. They think that the appropriate way to express such an intention is a statement about what one should be doing. Davidson, for example, thinks that the statement must essentially be a verdict: that doing such-and-such is all-out desirable. But this is to assume that practical reason is reasoning towards the truth of a proposition, the very mistake which obscures its ‘true character’, as Anscombe correctly points out. Moreover, although Davidson's view helps him account for the possibility of weakness of will, his explanation of the phenomenon is strained and inferior by contrast with the account which the proposed view makes available. The proposed view fits into a broader picture in which intentional action is the exercise of a practical conceptual capacity.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00476.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,617
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics:1-25.
Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.
Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

We-Intentions Revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
What Are Intentions?Elisabeth Pacherie & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - In L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press. pp. 70--84.
Are Intentions Self-Referential?Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (3):309-329.
Intention and Motivational Strength.Hugh McCann - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.
How Action Governs Intention.Nishi Shah - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-19.
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
Interpersonal Practical Reasoning.Myles Brand - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 30 (1):77-95.
Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.
Knowledge of Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press. pp. 170--197.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-10-22

Total views
550 ( #9,993 of 2,348,766 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #63,408 of 2,348,766 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes