Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Gettier Problem

Synthese 191 (17):4115-4130 (2014)
Authors
Mark McEvoy
Hofstra University
Abstract
This paper argues that reliabilism can handle Gettier cases once it restricts knowledge producing reliable processes to those that involve a suitable causal link between the subject’s belief and the fact it references. Causal tracking reliabilism (as this version of reliabilism is called) also avoids the problems that refuted the causal theory of knowledge, along with problems besetting more contemporary theories (such as virtue reliabilism and the “safety” account of knowledge). Finally, causal tracking reliabilism allows for a response to Linda Zagzebski’s challenge that no theory of knowledge can both eliminate the possibility of Gettier cases while also allowing fully warranted but false beliefs.
Keywords Reliabilism  Gettier Problem  Zagzebski  Causal Theory of Knowledge  Warrant
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0523-1
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

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