Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):84-105 (2017)

Authors
Brian McElwee
University of Southampton
Abstract
It is common for moral philosophers to reject a moral theory on the basis that its verdicts are unreasonably demanding—it requires too much of us to be a correct account of our moral obligations. Even though such objections frequently strike us as convincing, they give rise to two challenges: Are demandingness objections really independent of other objections to moral theories? Do standard demandingness objections not presuppose that costs borne by the comfortably off are more important than costs borne by the poor? These challenges have led some writers to question whether there really can be convincing demandingness objections, notwithstanding their strong initial appeal. David Sobel has argued that standard demandingness objections are ‘impotent’, Liam Murphy that they can be ‘dissolved’. In this paper, I aim to vindicate the possibility of demandingness objections by addressing these two challenges.
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqw020
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References found in this work BETA

The Limits of Morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
The Domain of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Moral Luck.B. Williams - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Aesthetic Supererogation.Alfred Archer & Lauren Ware - 2017 - Estetika 54 (1):102-116.
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Responsibility and the Demands of Morality.Stephen J. White - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (3).
Supererogation and the Case Against an 'Overall Ought'.Elizabeth Ventham - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):181-192.

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