Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):227-237 (2007)
AbstractMathematical apriorists sometimes hold that our non-derived mathematical beliefs are warranted by mathematical intuition. Against this, Philip Kitcher has argued that if we had the experience of encountering mathematical experts who insisted that an intuition-produced belief was mistaken, this would undermine that belief. Since this would be a case of experience undermining the warrant provided by intuition, such warrant cannot be a priori.I argue that this leaves untouched a conception of intuition as merely an aspect of our ordinary ability to reason. Thus the apriorist may still hold that some mathematical beliefs are warranted by intuition
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Citations of this work
The Epistemological Status of Computer-Assisted Proofs.Mark McEvoy - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):374-387.
References found in this work
In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a Priori Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (2):243-249.