Journal of Philosophical Research 34:7-20 (2009)
Duncan Pritchard's version of the safety analysis of knowledge has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and (the “safety principle”) in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the lottery puzzle. In this paper, I argue that the safety analysis of knowledge in fact fails to solve the lottery puzzle. I also argue that a revised version of the safety principle recently put forward by Pritchard fares no better
|Keywords||Safety Knowledge Lottery Problem Pritchard|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Lotteries, Quasi-Lotteries, and Scepticism.Eugene Mills - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):335 - 352.
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