Erkenntnis 14 (3):275 - 299 (1979)

This paper defends physical becoming against Grünbaum's attack, by constructing three arguments in favor of physical becoming. Of the three, I rely primarily on an argument from the philosophy of language, and especially on the principle that tensed discourse involves presuppositions and commitments that Grünbaum's account of becoming cannot handle. I show that Grünbaum's analysis of becoming can provide only a very implausible reconstruction of the temporal coordination of speakers engaged in discourse.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00174896
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