Another look at color

Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):537-53 (1996)
In The Subjective View,' I defended (unoriginally) a dispositional theory of color and drew out some consequences of that theory. The dispositional theory (DT) maintains, roughly speaking, that for an object to instantiate a color property is for it to have a disposition to cause experiences as of an object having that property in normal perceivers in normal conditions. This theory has notable merits in capturing (assuming one wants them captured) the subjectivity and relativity of ascriptions of color, while allowing that it is external ob- jects themselves that are colored. It makes colors both sense depen- dent and object qualifying.2 But it runs into prima facie problems in giving a plausible account of the phenomenology of color percep- tion, as I ruefully observed in my earlier book (op. cit., pp. 132-37)
Keywords Aesthetics  Color  Content  Epistemology  Perception  Subjectivity
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DOI jphil199693116
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Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
Brad J. Thompson (2010). The Spatial Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Clare Batty (2009). What's That Smell? Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.

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