Synthese 100 (2):197-239 (1994)

Abstract
  I defend a version of color subjectivism — that colors are sortals for certain neural events — by arguing against a sophisticated form of color objectivism and by showing how a subjectivist can legitimately explain the phenomenal fact that colors seem to be properties of external objects
Keywords Color  Mental  Mind  Objectivity  Perception  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01063810
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,077
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Theory of Sentience.Austen Clar (ed.) - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Color.Barry Maund - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.
Fitting Color Into the Physical World.Peter W. Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599.
Qualia and the Senses.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
104 ( #104,848 of 2,454,544 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #225,727 of 2,454,544 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes