This article applies a Wittgensteinian approach to the examination of the intelligibility of religious belief, in the wake of the recent attack on the Judeo-Christian religion by Richard Dawkins's book The God Delusion. The article attempts to show that Dawkins has confused religion with superstition, and that while Dawkins's arguments are decisive in the case of superstition, they do not successfully show religion to be a delusion. Religious belief in God is not like belief in the existence of a planet, and genuine religious faith is not like the belief in something for which there is not yet enough evidence, like belief in dark matter. The Christian doctrines of the resurrection and eternal life are misconstrued if they are understood as factual claims because they are then merely shallow superstitions, and not the great religious riddles they are meant to be
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