Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2000)
Authors | |
Abstract |
Identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth are fundamental philosophical concerns. Colin McGinn treats them both philosophically and logically, aiming for maximum clarity and minimum pointless formalism. He contends that there are real logical properties that challenge naturalistic metaphysical outlooks. These concepts are not definable, though we can say a good deal about how they work. The aim of Logical Properties is to bring philosophy back to philosophical logic
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Keywords | Logic |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2001, 2003 |
Buy this book | $35.95 new Amazon page |
Call number | BC71.M36 2000 |
ISBN(s) | 0199241813 9780199241811 9780199262632 0199262632 |
DOI | 10.1093/mind/111.442.449 |
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Existence as a Real Property: The Ontology of Meinongianism.Francesco Berto - 2012 - Synthèse Library, Springer.
Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic: Foundations and Applications of Transparent Intensional Logic.Marie Duží, Bjorn Jespersen & Pavel Materna - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
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