Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2000)

Authors
Abstract
Identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth are fundamental philosophical concerns. Colin McGinn treats them both philosophically and logically, aiming for maximum clarity and minimum pointless formalism. He contends that there are real logical properties that challenge naturalistic metaphysical outlooks. These concepts are not definable, though we can say a good deal about how they work. The aim of Logical Properties is to bring philosophy back to philosophical logic
Keywords Logic
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2001, 2003
Buy this book $14.94 used (58% off)   $35.95 new   Amazon page
Call number BC71.M36 2000
ISBN(s) 0199241813   9780199241811   9780199262632   0199262632
DOI 10.1093/mind/111.442.449
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,337
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Nonexistent Objects.Maria Reicher - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Truth : a concept unlike any other.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Supplement issue 2):S605-S630.

View all 85 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Propositional Logic.Kevin C. Klement - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Predication and Extensionalization.Bjørn Jespersen - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):479 - 499.
Synonymy Without Analyticity.Roger Wertheimer - 1994 - International Philosophical Preprint Exchange.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
132 ( #88,663 of 2,507,886 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #117,805 of 2,507,886 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes