Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:87-108 (2008)
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Sarah McGrath
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.
A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.

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