Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility

Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):259-281 (2015)
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This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view”. On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a “mind-making” practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms. It is not, as the standard view maintains, simply an epistemic capacity for coming to know about the mental states and dispositions already there. Importantly, the regulative view can meet and beat the standard at its own epistemic game. But it also does more. In Section 2, I show how the regulative view makes progress on two other problems that remain puzzling on the standard view: the problem of “first-person authority” – accounting for the special features of self-knowledge; and the problem of “reactive..



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Victoria McGeer
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Scaffolding agency: A proleptic account of the reactive attitudes.Victoria McGeer - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):301-323.
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Interpretivism and norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930.

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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.

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