Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):259-281 (2015)

Authors
Victoria McGeer
Princeton University
Abstract
This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view”. On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a “mind-making” practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms. It is not, as the standard view maintains, simply an epistemic capacity for coming to know about the mental states and dispositions already there. Importantly, the regulative view can meet and beat the standard at its own epistemic game. But it also does more. In Section 2, I show how the regulative view makes progress on two other problems that remain puzzling on the standard view: the problem of “first-person authority” – accounting for the special features of self-knowledge; and the problem of “reactive..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/13869795.2015.1032331
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,514
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

View all 119 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition.Kristin Andrews - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):36-56.
Interpretivism and Norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930.
Embodiment and Oppression: Reflections on Haslanger.Erin Beeghly - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1):35-47.
Justification, Conversation, and Folk Psychology.Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1):73-88.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Knowing One's Own Language.Barry C. Smith - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 391--428.
Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.
The View From the Background.Zdravko Radman - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):407-421.
Cognitive Institutions: The Cultural Context of Reasoning.Roger Kenneth Paden - 1981 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Causation and Responsibility.Carolina Sartorio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):749–765.
Agency.Markus E. Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Student as Moral Agent.Robert Boostrom - 1998 - Journal of Moral Education 27 (2):179-190.
Naturalism and Normativity.John Garde Fennell - 2000 - Dissertation, Northwestern University
Social Understanding Without Mentalizing.Julian Kiverstein - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):41-65.
Paternalism and Corporate Responsibility.David Crossley - 1999 - Journal of Business Ethics 21 (4):291 - 302.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-06-12

Total views
152 ( #59,531 of 2,348,163 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #237,421 of 2,348,163 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes