On Epistemic Alchemy
In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. pp. 173-189 (2014)
Crispin Wright has proposed that one has entitlements to accept certain propositions that play a foundational role within one’s body of belief. Such an entitlement is a kind of warrant that does not require the possessor to have acquired evidence speaking in favor of the proposition in question. The proposal allows Wright to concede much of the force of the most powerful arguments for scepticism, while avoiding the truly sceptical conclusion that one lacks warrant for most of one’s beliefs. Here I will argue that Wright has underestimated a problem for his proposal, the alchemy problem, which is that it seems to make room for the easy conversion of mere entitlement to accept a proposition into justification to believe it. I question the adequacy of Wright’s own response to this worry, and instead explore the idea that epistemic alchemy, properly understood, is not epistemically objectionable.
|Keywords||entitlement closure principles scepticism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
On Epistemic Entitlement.Crispin Wright & Martin Davies - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167-245.
The Concept of Entitlement and its Epistemic Relevance.Hamid Vahid - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):380-399.
Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.
Scepticism, Defeasible Evidence and Entitlement.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):439-455.
Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):467 - 479.
Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2014-09-02
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?