Authors
Matthew McGrath
Washington University in St. Louis
Jeremy Fantl
University of Calgary
Abstract
We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a principled argument for KA, based on the inference rule KB: if a subject knows that A is the best thing she can do, she is rational to do A. In the second half of the paper, we consider and reject the two most promising objections to our ease for KA, one based on the Gricean notion of conversational implicature and the other based on a contextualist maneuver
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00093.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:57-89.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.
Do You Know More When It Matters Less?Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.
The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.
Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.James Fritz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661.

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