Two purposes of knowledge-attribution and the contextualism debate

In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this chapter, we follow Edward Craig?s advice: ask what the concept of knowledge does for us and use our findings as clues about its application conditions. What a concept does for us is a matter of what we can do with it, and what we do with concepts is deploy them in thought and language. So, we will examine the purposes we have in attributing knowledge. This chapter examines two such purposes, agent evaluation and informant-suggestion, and brings the results to bear on an important debate about the application conditions of the concept of knowledge?the debate between contextualists and their rivals.



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants.James MacBain - 2004 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (2):193-211.
What's the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology.Michael Hannon - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Designing Epistemic Concepts.Luke E. Elwonger - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska
What's the point of knowing how?Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):693-708.


Added to PP

247 (#85,677)

6 months
95 (#54,040)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matthew McGrath
Washington University in St. Louis

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26.

View all 18 references / Add more references