Why Neuroscience Matters to Cognitive Neuropsychology

Synthese 159 (3):347 - 371 (2007)

Authors
Victoria McGeer
Princeton University
Abstract
The broad issue in this paper is the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience. That issue arises particularly sharply for cognitive neurospsychology, some of whose practitioners claim a methodological autonomy for their discipline. They hold that behavioural data from neuropsychological impairments are sufficient to justify assumptions about the underlying modular structure of human cognitive architecture, as well as to make inferences about its various components. But this claim to methodological autonomy can be challenged on both philosophical and empirical grounds. A priori considerations about (cognitive) multiple realisability challenge the thesis on philosophical grounds, and neuroscientific findings from developmental disorders substantiate that challenge empirically. The conclusion is that behavioural evidence alone is inadequate for scientific progress since appearances of modularity can be thoroughly deceptive, obscuring both the dynamic processes of neural development and the endstate network architecture of real cognitive systems
Keywords Cognitive neuropsychology  Modularity  Multiple realisability  Neuroconstructivism  Williams syndrome (WS)  Autism (ASD)  Face processing
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9234-1
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References found in this work BETA

Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) - 1970 - Cambridge University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

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Against the “System” Module.John Zerilli - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):231-246.

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