Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94 (2012)
Abstract
We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary (This strategy has been pursued by Steup 2008 ; Weatherson 2008 ). In this paper I argue that this strategy is neither successful nor necessary. Our doxastic states are not voluntary in any interesting sense. But once we see why our doxastic states are not voluntary, we can also see that there is no apparent reason to think that deontic prescriptions and appraisals—epistemic ones, at any rate—presuppose doxastic voluntarism. Indeed, there is good reason to deny that they do so. Finally, I diagnose the misleading attraction of the idea that what I call ‘epistemic deontology’ presupposes doxastic voluntarism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9299-6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,621
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Warrant: The Current Debate.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.
Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Ought to Believe.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
A New Rejection of Doxastic Voluntarism.Sergi Rosell - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):97-112.
Doxastic Voluntarism.Rico Vitz - 2008 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
An Essay on Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-07-15

Total downloads

136 ( #34,962 of 2,169,071 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #38,595 of 2,169,071 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums