Fittingness First

Ethics 126 (3):575-606 (2016)

Authors
Conor McHugh
University of Southampton
Jonathan Way
University of Southampton
Abstract
According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be fitting to value X. But what is it for an attitude to be fitting? A popular recent view is that it is for there to be sufficient reason for the attitude. In this paper we argue that proponents of the fitting-attitudes account should reject this view and instead take fittingness as basic. In this way they avoid the notorious ‘wrong kind of reason’ problem, and can offer attractive accounts of reasons and good reasoning in terms of fittingness.
Keywords Fittingness  Reasons  Value  Good Reasoning
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DOI 10.1086/684712
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.
Disagreement About Taste and Alethic Suberogation.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):516-535.

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