Judging as a non-voluntary action

Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269 (2011)

Authors
Conor McHugh
University of Southampton
Abstract
Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when combined with a conception of judging as a way of settling a question, explains both why judging is genuinely agential, and why it is nevertheless non-voluntary.
Keywords Judgment  Mental action  Epistemic goals  Epistemic normativity
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Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9478-3
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References found in this work BETA

Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle - 1999 - Courier Dover Publications.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
Belief and Aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.

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