Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

Oxford University Press (2018)
Authors
Jonathan Way
University of Southampton
Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton
Conor McHugh
University of Southampton
Abstract
What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. Philosophers have tended to investigate the issue of what to do independently of the issue of what to think, that is, to do ethics independently of epistemology, and vice versa. This collection of new essays by leading philosophers focuses on a central concern of both epistemology and ethics: normativity. Normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. The volume is innovative in drawing together issues from epistemology and ethics and in exploring neglected connections between epistemic and practical normativity. It represents a burgeoning research programme in which epistemic and practical normativity are seen as two aspects of a single topic, deeply interdependent and raising parallel questions.
Keywords epistemology  ethics  normativity
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,954
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
Chapters BETA

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Normativity.Stephen R. Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.
Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity.Chase Wrenn - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):273-290.
Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.
Sosa on the Normativity of Belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.
Epistemic Consequentialism.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Richard Rorty and Epistemic Normativity.Eric T. Kerr & J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (1):3-24.
Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity.Ruth Chang - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 243-71.
The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
Epistemic Side Constraints and the Structure of Epistemic Normativity.Zachary Silver - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):129-153.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-10-30

Total downloads
3 ( #857,705 of 2,293,875 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #411,560 of 2,293,875 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature