Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought


Authors
Jonathan Way
University of Southampton
Conor McHugh
University of Southampton
Abstract
What ought you believe? According to a traditional view, it depends on your evidence: you ought to believe (only) what your evidence supports. Recently, however, some have claimed that what you ought to believe depends not on your evidence but simply on what is true: you ought to believe (only) the truth. In this paper, we present and defend two arguments against this latter view. We also explore some of the parallels between this debate in epistemology, and the debate in ethics about whether how you ought to act depends on your epistemic position, or on all the facts.
Keywords epistemic ought  objectivism and perspectivism about 'ought'
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DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.005
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