Synthese 173 (3):231-257 (2010)

Authors
Conor McHugh
University of Southampton
Abstract
I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.
Keywords Philosophy   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language   Logic   Epistemology   Philosophy of Science
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9404-9
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

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