What Do We Aim At When We Believe?

Dialectica 65 (3):369-392 (2011)
Abstract
It is often said that belief aims at truth. I argue that if belief has an aim then that aim is knowledge rather than merely truth. My main argument appeals to the impossibility of forming a belief on the basis of evidence that only weakly favours a proposition. This phenomenon, I argue, is a problem for the truth-aim hypothesis. By contrast, it can be given a simple and satisfying explanation on the knowledge-aim hypothesis. Furthermore, the knowledge-aim hypothesis suggests a very plausible account of what it takes for evidence to be sufficiently good to make belief possible. I offer several further considerations in favour of the knowledge-aim hypothesis, and deal with objections. Although the main point of the paper is not to defend the view that belief has an aim, but to adjudicate between accounts of what that aim is, my argument nevertheless requires some attention to the motivation for attributing an aim to belief in the first place. In particular, I will explain an important advantage that this view has over the view that belief is not aim-directed, but only subject to a constitutive norm.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01270.x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.
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Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
Does Belief Aim at the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.

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