Philosophical Studies 43 (3):409 - 414 (1983)

Jane L. McIntyre
Cleveland State University
In "the first person" chisholm argues that the primary form of belief is non-Propositional belief about oneself. Belief about others is essentially indirect, Mediated by the attribution of a property to oneself. In this paper I argue that chisholm's account cannot give a non-Circular explanation of various plausible examples of "de re" belief
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372376
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