Intentionality, pluralism, and redescription

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):493-505 (2004)
Abstract
Donald Davidson, and others, have sometimes claimed that the subject matter of social science properly consists only of intentional actions. The author disputes this claim and explores an example drawn from social psychology that shows that some social scientific phenomena cannot be explained unless they are redescribed in nonintentional language. Key Words: intentionality • explanation • redescription • social science • Donald Davidson.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0048393104269197
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,803
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
Redescription and Descriptivism in the Social Sciences.Lee C. McIntyre - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):453 - 464.
Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional?Anders Nes - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):205–215.
The Ethics of Rortian Redescription.Brad Frazier - 2006 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 32 (4):461-492.
Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
Intentionality and Physical Systems.Margaret A. Boden - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 32 (June):200-214.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
6 ( #575,172 of 2,202,778 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #301,722 of 2,202,778 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature