Synthese 152 (3):393-401 (2006)

Jane L. McIntyre
Cleveland State University
References to strength of mind, a character trait implying “the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”, occur in a number of important discussions of motivation in the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Nevertheless, Hume says surprisingly little about what strength of mind is, or how it is achieved. This paper argues that Hume’s theory of the passions can provide an interesting and defensible account of strength of mind. The paper concludes with a brief comparison of Humean strength of mind with autonomy.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9005-4
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,787
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Character: A Humean Account.Jane L. McIntyre - 1990 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (2):193 - 206.
Personal Identity and the Passions.Jane L. McIntyre - 1989 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4):545-557.
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections.Francis Hutcheson - 1742 - Gainesville, Fla., Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Problems of Philosophy Problem #12: Epistemology From a Strategic Viewpoint.[author unknown] - 1998 - Synthese 116 (1):113-113.
Problems of Philosophy. Problem #2: Logic and Semantics of Quantifiers.[author unknown] - 1997 - Synthese 112 (2):301-302.
The Special Status of Instrumental Reasons.Stephanie Beardman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):255 - 287.
Human Action and the Humean Universe.Laird Addis - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (1-2):23-40.


Added to PP index

Total views
99 ( #103,195 of 2,425,676 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #351,462 of 2,425,676 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes