Bertrand Russell and logical truth

Philosophia 27 (3-4):541-553 (1999)
I expose a tension in Bertrand Russell's, _Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, between his account of logical truth and his view that logical truth is knowable without taking into account what the world is like. Russell makes the logical truth of a sentence turn on the actual truth of its second-order universal closure. But this results in making logical truth relative to the number of worldly individuals. I aim to use the tension in _Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy to classify the status of the model-theoretic account as an analysis of the modal notions in classical logic
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Philosophy of Language   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Science
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DOI 10.1007/BF02383198
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