Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):698-733 (2017)

Authors
Brandon Warmke
Bowling Green State University
Michael McKenna
University of Arizona
Abstract
The situationist movement in social psychology has caused a considerable stir in philosophy. Much of this was prompted by the work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. Both contended that familiar philosophical assumptions about the role of character in the explanation of action were not supported by experimental results. Most of the ensuing philosophical controversy has focused upon issues related to moral psychology and ethical theory. More recently, the influence of situationism has also given rise to questions regarding free will and moral responsibility. There is cause for concern that a range of situationist findings are in tension with the reasons-responsiveness putatively required for free will and moral responsibility. We develop and defend a response to the alleged situationist threat to free will and moral responsibility that we call pessimistic realism. We conclude on an optimistic note, exploring the possibility of strengthening our agency in the face of situational influences.
Keywords free will   moral responsibility   situationism  reasons-responsiveness
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DOI 10.1163/17455243-46810068
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References found in this work BETA

Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
A New Indifference Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Zhang Wan - 2017 - 4th BEIJING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE.
Reasons‐Sensitivity and Degrees of Free Will.Alex Kaiserman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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