Epistemic Injustice

Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446 (2016)
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Abstract

There's been a great deal of interest in epistemology regarding what it takes for a hearer to come to know on the basis of a speaker's say-so. That is, there's been much work on the epistemology of testimony. However, what about when hearers don't believe speakers when they should? In other words, what are we to make of when testimony goes wrong? A recent topic of interest in epistemology and feminist philosophy is how we sometimes fail to believe speakers due to inappropriate prejudices – implicit or explicit. This is known as epistemic injustice. In this article, I discuss Miranda Fricker's groundbreaking work on epistemic injustice, as well as more recent developments that both offer critique and expansion on the nature and extent of epistemic injustice.

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Rachel McKinnon
College of Charleston

Citations of this work

"On Anger, Silence and Epistemic Injustice".Alison Bailey - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:93-115.
God and Interpersonal Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):421-447.
Epistemic Injustice and Deepened Disagreement.T. J. Lagewaard - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1571-1592.

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References found in this work

Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.
White Ignorance.Charles W. Mills - 2007 - In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany, NY: State Univ of New York Pr. pp. 11-38.
Can the Subaltern Speak?Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak - 1988 - Die Philosophin 14 (27):42-58.

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