Noûs 42 (4):770-793 (2008)
Harry Frankfurt dramatically shaped the debates over freedom and responsibility by arguing that the sort of freedom germane to responsibility does not involve the freedom to do otherwise. His argument turns upon an example meant to disprove the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Debate over Frankfurt's argument has turned almost exclusively on the success of the example meant to defeat it. But there is more to Frankfurt's argument than the example in question, and this is not widely recognized. Inattention to these other aspects of Frankfurt's argument has distorted the force of it. In this paper I shall explore avenues for both refuting and advancing Frankfurt's argument that look beyond the examples. These further considerations invite us to think in broader terms about moral responsibility's nature and the sort of freedom required for it.
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References found in this work BETA
The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control.John Martin Fischer - 1994 - Blackwell.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Citations of this work BETA
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Whose Argumentative Burden, Which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.Michael McKenna - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.
A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.
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