Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning

Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne gainst the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and practical reasoning. I will conclude by suggesting a prescription for properly using lottery propositions to do the sort of work that Hawthorne wants from them.

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2011-10-01

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Rachel McKinnon
College of Charleston

Citations of this work

Knowledge, Practical Reasoning and Action.Peter Baumann - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):7-26.

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