Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning

Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231 (2011)
Authors
Rachel McKinnon
College of Charleston
Abstract
This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne gainst the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and practical reasoning. I will conclude by suggesting a prescription for properly using lottery propositions to do the sort of work that Hawthorne wants from them.
Keywords Knowledge Norm  Lotteries  Practical Reasoning
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What Else Justification Could Be.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.

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