Lotteries, Knowledge, and Irrelevant Alternatives

Dialogue 52 (3):523-549 (2013)
Rachel McKinnon
College of Charleston
The lottery paradox plays an important role in arguments for various norms of assertion. Why is it that, prior to information on the results of a draw, assertions such as, “My ticket lost,” seem inappropriate? This paper is composed of two projects. First, I articulate a number of problems arising from Timothy Williamson’s analysis of the lottery paradox. Second, I propose a relevant alternatives theory, which I call the Non-Destabilizing Alternatives Theory , that better explains the pathology of asserting lottery propositions, while permitting assertions of what I call fallible propositions such as, “My car is in the driveway.” Le paradoxe de la loterie joue un rôle important dans l’argumentation visant à défendre diverses normes de l’assertion. Comment se fait-il que, avant que les résultats d’un tirage soient connus, des assertions comme «Mon billet a perdu» semblent inappropriées? Cet article se compose de deux projets. Premièrement, je relève certains problèmes issus de l’analyse du paradoxe de la loterie par Timothy Williamson. Deuxièmement, je propose une théorie des alternatives pertinentes que j’appelle la «théorie des alternatives non-déstabilisantes» , et qui explique d’une meilleure façon la pathologie de l’assertion de propositions concernant la loterie, tout en permettant des assertions faillibles, telles que «Ma voiture est dans l’entrée»
Keywords Lottery paradox  Norms of assertion  Knowledge  Knowledge norm  Williamson  Hawthorne
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217313000656
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References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
What Else Justification Could Be.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.
Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.

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