Normative scorekeeping

Synthese 191 (3):607-625 (2014)

Authors
Robin McKenna
University of Liverpool
Abstract
Epistemic contextualists think that the truth-conditions of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions depend in part on the context in which they are uttered. But what features of context play a role in determining truth-conditions? The idea that the making salient of error possibilities is a central part of the story has often been attributed to contextualists, and a number of contextualists seem to endorse it (see Cohen (Philos Perspect, 13:57–89, 1999) and Hawthorne, (Knowledge and lotteries, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004)). In this paper I argue that the focus on salience relations is a mistake. On the view I defend, the relevant features of context are facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context have a reason to consider, not facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context actually consider. As I will argue, this view has certain advantages over the standard view
Keywords Contextualism  Epistemology  Edward Craig  Scorekeeping  Reasons  Philosophy of language
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0293-1
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What's the Point of Knowing How?Joshua Habgood‐Coote - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):693-708.
What the metasemantics of know is not.Peter van Elswyk - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1):69-82.
Epistemic Contextualism Defended.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):363-383.
How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.
Shifting Targets and Disagreements.Robin McKenna - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):725-742.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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