Authors
Tucker McKinney
University of Chicago (PhD)
Abstract
Heidegger claims that Dasein’s capacity for adopting intentional stances toward the world is grounded in the reflective structure of its being, which dictates that Dasein exists for the sake of a possibility of itself. Commentators have glossed this reflective structure in terms of the idea that our subjection to the normative demands of intentionality is grounded in a basic commitment to upholding an identity-concept, such as an occupation or social role. I argue that this gloss has serious adverse implications for Heidegger’s philosophical project and for the internal coherence of his theory of intention. I recommend an alternative gloss on the reflective structure of existence, according to which sustaining a robust claim to openness to the world specifies the universal, formal object of intentional stance-taking. The reflective structure of existence should be understood through the concept of self-maintenance, rather than self-definition.
Keywords Heidegger  Intentionality  Practical Identity  Objectivity  Intention  Normativity
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DOI 10.1017/apa.2016.2
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References found in this work BETA

Being and Time.Ronald W. Hepburn - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (56):276.
Action, Emotion and Will.Keith S. Donnellan - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):526.
A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research.Thomas Sheehan - 2001 - Continental Philosophy Review 34 (2):183-202.

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