Philosophy Compass 12 (4) (2017)
Ontic structural realism is at its core the view that “structure is ontologically fundamental.” Informed from its inception by the scientific revolutions that punctuated the 20th century, its advocates often present the position as the perspective on ontology best befitting of modern physics. But the idea that structure is fundamental has proved difficult to articulate adequately, and what OSR's claimed naturalistic credentials consist in is hard to precisify as well. Nor is it clear that the position is actually supported by our most fundamental physical theories. What is clear, however, is that structuralists have revealed a seam of material at the core of modern physics that is replete with implications for metaphysics. This article will survey some positions subsumed under the rubric of OSR, considering both their warrant and the interconnections that exist between them. It will be argued that the fundamental kind properties pose a challenge to ontic structuralism, because it seems that these properties do not supervene upon the relevant structures. But it will also be argued that the development of structuralist metaphysics will require both an engagement with the details of modern physical theories and the deployment of tools more typically developed in a priori metaphysics. As such, it seems armchair metaphysicians have not just a stake in whether OSR's claims may ultimately be shown to stand up, but a crucial role to play in getting them to the point where they can be subjected to scrutiny in the first place.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Looking Forward, Not Back: Supporting Structuralism in the Present.Kerry McKenzie - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:87-95.
The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism.Michael Esfeld - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):179 – 194.
Kinds of Objects and Varieties of Properties.Antigone M. Nounou - forthcoming - In Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structures, Objects and Causality. Springer.
The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity.Vincent Lam & Michael Esfeld - 2012 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (2):243-258.
Do Objects Depend on Structures?J. Wolff - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):607-625.
Ontic Structural Realism as a Metaphysics of Objects.Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam - 2011 - In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. pp. 143-159.
A Metaphysics For Mathematical And Structural Realism.Adam Gerard - 2009 - Stance 2:76-89.
Ontic Structural Realism, Information, and Natural Necessity: Where Naturalism and Analytic Metaphysics Can Find Common Ground.William Kallfelz - unknown
Causation and Structural Realism.Martin Schmidt - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (4):508-521.
In Defense of an Essentialist Approach to Ontic Structural Realism.Tomasz Bigaj - 2014 - Methode: Analytic Perspective 3 (4):1-24.
Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?Matteo Morganti - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1165-1176.
Added to index2017-04-25
Total downloads26 ( #198,133 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)26 ( #12,083 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?