Presentism and consciousness
Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):305-323 (2003)
Abstract
The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embracedAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Presentism and Temporal Experience.Akiko Frischhut - 2017 - In Ian B. Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
