Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):305-323 (2003)
The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced
|Keywords||Consciousness Duration Metaphysics Presentism Time|
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Citations of this work BETA
Time-Series of Ephemeral Impressions: The Abhidharma-Buddhist View of Conscious Experience.Monima Chadha - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):543-560.
Presentism, Truthmakers and Distributional Properties.Phil Corkum - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3427-46.
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