Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal

Oxford University Press (2006)
Abstract
Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a regulative ideal.".
Keywords Ethics  Principle (Philosophy
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Call number BJ37.M35 2006
ISBN(s) 0199290652     9780199290659
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Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.
A Defense of a Particularist Research Program.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):181-199.
Ethical Intuitionism and the Linguistic Analogy.Philipp Schwind - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):292-311.
Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):463-474.

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