Principled ethics: generalism as a regulative ideal

New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Michael R. Ridge (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a regulative ideal.".

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,377

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
184 (#116,790)

6 months
23 (#155,717)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Sean McKeever
Davidson College
Michael Ridge
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.
Moral Particularism.Jonathan Dancy - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reasons, Reason, and Context.Daniel Fogal - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.

View all 87 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references