Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2006)

Abstract
Plural predication is a pervasive part of ordinary language. We can say that some people are fifty in number, are surrounding a building, come from many countries, and are classmates. These predicates can be true of some people without being true of any one of them; they are non-distributive predications. However, the apparatus of modern logic does not allow a place for them. Thomas McKay here explores the enrichment of logic with non-distributive plural predication and quantification. His book will be of great interest to philosophers of language, linguists, metaphysicians, and logicians.
Keywords Semantics (Philosophy  Language and languages Philosophy  Predicate (Logic  Grammar, Comparative and general Number  Logic
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Call number B840.M435 2006
ISBN(s) 0199278148   9780199278145
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