Random Boolean networks and evolutionary game theory

Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1289-1304 (2003)
Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game-theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution of social norms.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/377408
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,798
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):21 - 25.
Sort Out Your Neighbourhood.Kai P. Spiekermann - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):273 - 294.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?Cedric Paternotte & Jonathan Grose - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):551-587.
Explaining Fairness in Complex Environments.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):81-97.
Explaining the Social Contract.Zachary Ernst - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):1-24.
Evolutionary Games Without Rationality?Martin Bunzl - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):365-378.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
143 ( #34,615 of 2,202,679 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #301,061 of 2,202,679 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature