Philosophical Review 80 (2):220-229 (1971)

Abstract
Searle has proposed a "presupposition-Theory" of proper names in which he maintains that names are not short for descriptions and which, He claims, Solves frege's puzzle as to how an identity-Sentence containing co-Referential names can be informative. Two possible interpretations of searle's view are proposed, And it is argued that neither interpretation can be used to solve frege's puzzle and that, On the most plausible interpretation of his view, Searle is committed to the thesis that names are short for descriptions after all.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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DOI 10.2307/2184031
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