The bare metaphysical possibility of bare dispositions

Abstract
Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part 1, I explain more fully what I mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions are not bare. In part 3, I consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases. In part 4, I consider arguments by Smith and Stoljar that there can't be bare dispositions because they would make for unwelcome "barely true" counterfactuals. In the end, I find no reason to deny the possibility of bare dispositions.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00265.x
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The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation.R. Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):22-39.
The Ungrounded Argument.Stephen Mumford - 2006 - Synthese 149 (3):471-489.
Unfinkable Dispositions.Toby Handfield - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):297 - 308.
Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.

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