Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):349–369 (2003)
Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part 1, I explain more fully what I mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions are not bare. In part 3, I consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases. In part 4, I consider arguments by Smith and Stoljar that there can't be bare dispositions because they would make for unwelcome "barely true" counterfactuals. In the end, I find no reason to deny the possibility of bare dispositions.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.
Similar books and articles
The Price of Insisting That Quantum Mechanics is Complete.P. D. Magnus - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):257-267.
Bare Particulars and Individuation Reply to Mertz.J. P. Moreland & Timothy Pickavance - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):1 – 13.
Causation, Laws and Dispositions.Andreas Hüttemann - 2007 - In Max Kistler & Bruno Gnassounou (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate.
Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases?Gabriele Contessa - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):622-638.
Three Theses About Dispositions.Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter & Frank Jackson - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):251-257.
The Metaphysics of Dispositions and Causes.Toby Handfield - 2009 - In Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press. pp. 1--30.
Why Dispositions Are (Still) Distinct From Their Bases and Causally Impotent.Bradley Rives - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):19 - 31.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads104 ( #45,569 of 2,146,823 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #75,241 of 2,146,823 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.