Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):55-76 (2007)

Authors
Michael Ridge
University of Edinburgh
Sean McKeever
Davidson College
Abstract
Particularism takes an extremely ecumenical view of what considerations might count as reasons and thereby threatens to ‘flatten the moral landscape’ by making it seem that there is no deep difference between, for example, pain, and shoelace color. After all, particularists have claimed, either could provide a reason provided a suitable moral context. To avoid this result, some particularists draw a distinction between default and non-default reasons. The present paper argues that all but the most deflationary ways of drawing this distinction are either implausible or else insufficient to help the particularist avoid flattening the moral landscape. The difficulty can be avoided, however, if we reject particularism's extremely ecumenical view of reasons
Keywords defeasible generalizations   primary reason   particularism   default reason   Jonathan Dancy   secondary reason
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DOI 10.1177/1740468106072786
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References found in this work BETA

Particularism and Antitheory.Mark Lance & Margaret Little - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 567--594.
Particularism and Presumptive Reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 76:169-90.
Moral Generalities Revisited.Margaret Olivia Little - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Defense of a Particularist Research Program.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):181-199.
Moral Particularism.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Defeasibility and Inferential Particularism.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):80-98.

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