Logos and Episteme 3 (4):565-569 (2012)

Authors
Rachel McKinnon
College of Charleston
Abstract
It is increasingly argued that there is a single unified constitutive norm of both assertion and practical reasoning. The most common suggestion is that knowledge is this norm. If this is correct, then we would expect that a diagnosis of problematic assertions should manifest as problematic reasons for acting. Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that assertions epistemically grounded in isolated second-hand knowledge (ISHK) are unwarranted. I argue that decisions epistemically grounded in premises based on ISHK also seem inappropriate. I finish by suggesting that this finding has important implications for the debates regarding the norms of assertion and practical reasoning.
Keywords Norms of Assertion  Knowledge Norm  Norms of Practical Reasoning  Isolated SEcond-Hand Knowledge
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme2012343
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Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.

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