A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem

Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204 (2003)
Abstract
widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that we are phenomenally consciousness, and that there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated in nonphenomenal terms . 1,2 Block points out that while phenomenal realists reject
Keywords Metaphysics  Mind  Naturalism  Phenomena  Realism  Block, N
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DOI 10.1111/1533-6077.00011
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References found in this work BETA
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Search for Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):461–474.
Phenomenal Concepts and the Defense of Materialism. [REVIEW]Brian P. Mclaughlin - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):206-214.
Taking Type-B Materialism Seriously.Janet Levin - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.

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