Can We Provide a Plausible Evolutionary Account of the Emergence of Phenomenal Consciousness?
Abstract
The nature of phenomenal consciousness has been the subject of much debate. It seems that the phenomenal character of certain mental states is intimately related to the functional, cognitive or intentional properties of those states. The relationship between functional, intentional and cognitive properties and phenomenal properties remains mysterious. Explaining the evolutionary development of such states may enable us to develop a better understanding of the nature of phenomenal consciousness. It is therefore my aim to evaluate the prospect of providing a plausible evolutionary explanation of phenomenal consciousness. I discuss the distinction highlighted by Block between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, before identifying some of the important features of phenomenal consciousness that need to be explained. I then discuss attempts to provide an evolutionary account of consciousness from Daniel Dennett and Peter Carruthers, evaluating whether they account for the emergence of phenomenal consciousness or access consciousness, as distinguished by Block. I compare these accounts and assess whether they can account for any of the important features of phenomenal consciousness. I finally evaluate the implications this might have for the prospect of a successful evolutionary account of the emergence of phenomenal consciousness.Author's Profile
Reprint years
2014
My notes
Similar books and articles
Adaptive complexity and phenomenal consciousness.Shaun Nichols & Todd Grantham - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):648-670.
Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
Phenomenal consciousness lite: No thanks!J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.
Relationalism and the problems of consciousness.William Fish - 2008 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):167-80.
The ontology of creature consciousness: A challenge for philosophy.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):103-104.
PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.
The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tom McClelland - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):125 - 151.
Conceptualizing physical consciousness.James Tartaglia - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):817-838.
How many kinds of consciousness?David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.
The scientific untraceability of phenomenal consciousness.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (4):509-529.
Addressing Higher-Order Misrepresentation with Quotational Thought.Vincent Picciuto - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):109-136.
Consciousness: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and scientific practice.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
Analytics
Added to PP
2014-03-26
Downloads
29 (#405,458)
6 months
3 (#227,700)
2014-03-26
Downloads
29 (#405,458)
6 months
3 (#227,700)
Historical graph of downloads