Stephen K. McLeod
University of Liverpool
As part of his attack on Frege’s ‘myth’ that senses reside in the third realm, Dummett alleges that Frege’s view that all objects are selbständig is an underlying mistake, since some objects depend upon others. Whatever the merits of Dummett’s other arguments against Frege’s conception of sense, this objection fails. First, Frege’s view that senses are third-realm entities is not traceable to his view that all objects are selbständig. Second, while Frege recognizes that there are objects that are dependent upon other objects, he does not take this to compromise the Selbständigkeit of any objects. Thus, Frege’s doctrine that objects are selbständig does not make the claim of absolute independence that Dummett appears to have taken it to make. Nevertheless, in order to make a good case against Frege based on the dependency of senses, Dummett need only establish his claim that senses depend upon expressions: appeal to an absolute conception of independence is unnece...
Keywords expresssions  logical independence  objects  ontological independence  senses
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1080/09608788.2016.1230538
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,044
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Über Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
Ontological Dependence.Tuomas E. Tahko & E. J. Lowe - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ueber Sinn Und Bedeutung (Summary).Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Philosophical Review 1 (5):574-575.
Frege.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):149-188.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

I. Frege as a Realist.Michael Dummett - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):455-468.
I. Interpreting Frege: A Reply to Michael Dummett.Gregory Currie - 1983 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):345 – 359.
Frege, Dummett and the Philistines.Nicholas Measor - 1978 - Analysis 38 (1):10 - 16.
Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
Senses of Compositionality and Compositionality of Senses.Cheng-Chih Tsai - 2009 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 8:86-104.
Are Truth Values Objects?Robert Ray - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (2):199 - 211.
Review of G. Duke: Dummett on Abstract Objects. [REVIEW]Bob Hale - 2013 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2 (2).
Frege and Dummett Are Two.Alex Oliver - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):74-82.
Frege in Context.Delbert Pard Reed - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
Frege on Indexicals: Sense and Context Sensitivity.Richard Charles Devidi - 1996 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
Objectivity and Reality in Lotze and Frege.Michael Dummett - 1982 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):95 – 114.


Added to PP index

Total views
38 ( #275,697 of 2,433,597 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #172,429 of 2,433,597 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes