Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66 (2006)

Abstract
Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility
Keywords Epiphenomenalism  Epistemology  Functionalism  Mental Event  Mental States  Role
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,617
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Social Ontology.Brian Epstein - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conceiving of Pain.Brendan O'sullivan & Peter Hanks - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):351-376.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epiphenomenalism.Keith Campbell & Nicholas J. J. Smith - 1993 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted.Irwin Goldstein - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism.Rex Welshon - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism?Amir Horowitz - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
Mental States and Putnam's Functionalist Hypothesis.William G. Lycan - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):48-62.
A New Lilliputian Argument Against Machine Functionalism.William G. Lycan - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (April):279-87.
What is Functionalism?Ned Block - 1996 - In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), [Book Chapter]. MacMillan.
Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism.Dwayne Moore - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
279 ( #27,384 of 2,348,763 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #45,672 of 2,348,763 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes