Is role-functionalism committed to epiphenomenalism?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66 (2006)
Abstract
Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility
Keywords Epiphenomenalism  Epistemology  Functionalism  Mental Event  Mental States  Role
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Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism.Dwayne Moore - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.

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